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1.-Introduction and motivation
The question of instruments to be used to reduce French public debt has been at the heart of the debates on economic policy since the 2008/2009 crisis led to a strong surge in its ratio expressed as a percentage of GDP. Public debt according to the Maastricht 3 definition amounted to 84.4% of GDP in 2010, representing an increase of 16.3 points of GDP as compared with 2008. This situation is all the more worrying in that the strong progression in public debt is not simply a phenomenon relating to the current economic situation, but is also structural in nature: debt has been increasing for 30 years following progression of the average annual public deficit of 3 points of GDP and no budget has been voted in order to achieve a balance since 1974. Hence questions as to the strategies that would allow this upward trend to be countered.
Three options at least usually fuel the debate between economists. The first would rely on a solution whereby a rate of inflation above the 2% target usually retained by the European Central Bank would be tolerated. For example, Olivier Blanchard, chief economist of the IMF proposed to raise this target to the level of 4%. In addition to the fact that it would allow the nominal growth rate to be increased and lead mechanically to a drop in the debt ratio, inflation would above all provide a means to reduce real interest rates (and thus stimulate growth) as the crisis is left behind. Critics of this proposal argue its uncertain effects considering the potential increase in risk premiums on public debt leading in turn to a snowball effect on debt.
A second solution to stop the progression of debt would be to reduce primary deficits. This approach provides the basis for current restrictive budget policies and measures aiming to constrain their development by rules (whether constitutional or not) and by stiffening the conditions of the European Stability and Growth Pact. However, the effects on the debt ratio are no less uncertain since economic growth, in the short and long term, is reliant on budget deficits. In the short term, automatic stabilizers dampen the effects of recession, while in the long term, the potential growth rate depends on public expenditure intended to improve the economy's competitiveness (with investment, research and development, and education). The effects of budget consolidation on the debt ratio thus depend on budget multipliers. In addition, cuts in public expenditure and tax hikes have redistributive effects whose impact on growth and debt should not be underestimated.
A third possible approach would be to adopt strategies allowing the trend in the growth rate of the economy to be pushed up above the interest rate on the debt. This strategy could indeed bring down the debt ratio in the short term, but its sustained impact will depend on the extent to which strategies for growth can be sustained, with some being liable to lead to imbalances (high private sector debt, creation of bubbles and an increase in global macroeconomic imbalances).
Strategies aimed at stopping the upward dynamic of public debt are thus subject to uncertainty and open to debate. The recent spiral of public debt following the 2008 depression led to the suggestion that models be constructed to better predict it on the basis of advanced indicators. While the accounting approach based on Government's budget constraints only allows for ex post analysis of contributions made by the determinants of the debt to the debt ratio, econometric models remain useful in conducting analyses in terms of prediction (thus ex ante).
The aim of the present paper is to study to what extent developments in the primary balance, growth in GDP, the debt burden and the rate of inflation, in a given year, allow changes in the evolution of the debt ratio from an upward to a downward trend. A conventional approach in addressing this question is to consider an indicator of vulnerability or fragility of the debt ratio and test the degree of predictability of the variables considered as advanced indicators (or warnings) of greater or lesser vulnerability. For the present purpose, a simple measurement for fragility of the debt ratio is retained by differentiating upward and downward phases in this ratio. An upward movement makes the government more vulnerable due to potential problems of sustainability that can arise in the long term, and through negative externalities that can weigh more heavily on its budget constraints (rise in premium rates, Ricardian effects). Conversely, when the debt ratio decreases, this kind of difficulty is less likely to be observed. Advanced or warning indicators retained here are quite simply the four basic determinants of the debt ratio as enumerated previously.
The period studied spans the years from 1890 to 2009. Our motivation for adopting a longrun perspective lies in the fact that the public debt ratio has been increasing on average for twenty five years and long series therefore need to be considered to encompass alternating periods of significant reductions in this ratio and periods showing an upward trend.
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Furthermore, providing a historical perspective facilitates the comparison between different periods characterized by dissimilar economic policies and varying economic contexts. A number of authors have proposed works on changes in the French public debt over medium or long periods 4 . Their objective is to emphasize the salient features of the dynamics of debt over a number of centuries, or decades. Most of these works reason ex post in the sense that variations in the debt ratio are interpreted once they have occurred. Given the substance of current debate (thinking of the appropriate instruments to reverse the ever upward trend of the debt ratio), it may be of interest to reason ex ante, contemplating whether the rises and the falls in the public debt ratio observed in the past could have been foreseen, based on the observation of the dynamics of inflation, economic growth and budget policy orientations.
Addressing this question will provide indications as to the way these variables can be worked on to reduce the debt ratio. We propose a model based on time-varying probability Markov switching process and show that over a period including the end of the 19 th century and the entire 20 th century, these variables have, since the middle of the 1980s, only a weak explanatory power to predict reductions in the debt ratio, including during the years of improvement in primary surpluses or accelerated growth. One of the interesting results here is that episodes of reduction in the debt ratio were only likely when they were preceded by substantial improvements in primary balances or substantial increases in growth rate, which 
2.-Data
We use annual data beginning in 1890, because before 1890 data on French public finances are scarcefor France. The accounting of public finance have changed several times over the period we consider. To our knowledge, no homogenous series are available from 1890 to
2009. So, we had to combine different existing databases giving priority to national sources.
Public finance data
For public finance data (debt, fiscal balance, debt burden), we limited ourselves to primary national sources by focusing on data from national accounts for several reasons. 
Public debt
Information on public debt in national accounts before 1979 are not available before 1979, thus we used state public debt as a proxy, which is available since 1890.
For the period 1890-1938, we consider data from Villa (1993 can occur just a few years after a government initially succeeded in slowing down its increase; it can also be difficult to achieve due to a snowball effect. Similarly, the debt ratio can increase very rapidly, or more slowly, according to whether the government has managed (or not managed) to generate surpluses over the previous years. Consequently, the successive emergence of such regimes is prone to a phenomenon of inertia. The econometric model thus has to formulate hypotheses, not only as to the way in which these regimes occur in succession, but also on the speed of transition from one regime to another.
The observation of regime 1 or 2 for year t thus depends on the successive regimes that were achieved in years t-1, t-2,…, t-k. Since it is not known in advance which regime will emerge, a probability 0,1 has to be ascribed to its occurrence. To simplify matters, it can be admitted that the variable follows a Markov process of order one, implying that the 8 development of the debt ratio in an upward or downward trend over a given year is influenced only by the m obs ed rev o r regi e erv the p i us yea :
As the dynamic of the debt ratio is theoretically influenced by the macroeconomic environment (growth, inflation and trend in interest rates) and budget policy (budget balance trends), it is reasonable to assume that the increase or reduction in debt from one year to another depends on these variables. Consequently,
and
where indicates the contemporary or past values of growth rate, inflation rate, interest rate payments, or the ratio of the primary balance. In equation (3), is a linear function of (known as the transition variable). The influence of budget policy and macroeconomic variables on the rate of variation in the debt ratio for a given year thus depends on the regime observed initially over the previous year. This explains why a and b depend on . is a random term s lati r b n n n n who e cumu ve dist i utio fu ctio is oted . W
e thus write: j=1,2. To describe the changes a logistic form is retained for . From equation (4a), the following can be deduced:
We briefly indicate, through examples, how the coefficients must be interpreted. Let us assume that 1 and 2 indicate respectively debt ratio downward and upward trends, and that z is the growth rate for year t-1. Also assume that b 0 and b 0. In this case, if the debt ratio increased over year t-1, it is likely that it will decrease the following year subsequent to a boost in the growth rate (b 0 and, if it was already diminishing, it is 9 probable that it will continue to do so (b
0)
10 . Now assume that is the primary balance expressed as a percentage of GDP for year t-1 and that b 0, b 0. In this case, if the debt ratio were to increase over year t-1, it could continue to increase despite budgetary consolidation (with all the more likelihood in so far as the value of b is great). But if the debt ratio were to diminish in year t-1, budgetary consolidation could lead it to diminish further the following year. This type of situation expresses sensitivity to the regime initially observed and can be explained by the "weight" of budgetary practices, or the scale of budgetary multipliers.
In order to take into account the lesser or greater inertia of its dynamics in each regime, an autoregressive process in the growth rate of the debt ratio is introduced into each. The model is thus supp e l mented by the following equation: The TVPMS model framework is useful to characterize dynamics with regime-switching.
The initial formulation was proposed by Filardo (1994) , and Filardo and Gordon (1998). A general framework was introduced by Kim et al. (2008) . This type of model can be distinguished from Markov switching models as proposed by Hamilton (1989) by the fact that the transition probabilities vary over time. The parameters for this model are estimated using the maximum likelihood method, as proposed by Kim et al (2008) .
The vector of observations of the debt ratio and the variable for transition of the initial year until year 1 ned by t-is defi
The conditional likelihood function of observations is defined by the following expression:
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10 Indeed, b and b measure respectively the effect of a variation in as to the likelihood of remaining in regime1, , and the probability of remaining in regime 2, between two years.
where
Using Bayes' theorem, the following obtains:
,
The function f in equation (9) is the function of conditional density depending on the regimes expressed in the following developed form:
The choice of the best model 11 is made retaining several criteria, namely information criteria of the AIC/BIC type, correlation tests on weighted normalized estimation residuals (Ljung-Box statistic) and by applying non-linearity tests on the estimated residuals (nonparametric test based on the Hinich and Patterson (1989) and Tsay (1996) ).
3.2.-Have primary inflation, growth and primary balances been advanced indicators of the French debt ratio since 1890?
Figure 1 shows the trend in the public debt ratio from 1890 to 2009 in both level and growth rate. The dynamics of growth rate shows the years during which the variability in the debt ratio is especially significant. These are generally the years corresponding to the two 11 Indeed, one of the special features of TVPMS models is to generate multiple equilibria considering the nonlinearity of the likelihood function to be optimized. The choice of equilibrium to be retained is decided on the basis of statistical criteria.
world wars and the five years following them. To neutralize the effect of this variability on the estimation results, a variable defined as the product of the growth rate in the debt ratio with an indicator variable valued at 1 for the years 1914-25, 1940-1946, 1948,1970 and 1983 (0 for the other years) is added to the right of the equation (5). The idea is to isolate the effect of these years whose observations would otherwise absorb a significant share of the explained variance.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
To evaluate the impact of the primary balance ratio on the dynamics of the growth rate for debt, it is decomposed into two parts distinguishing the trend and cyclical components.
Similarly, the influence of the cyclical and trend components of the growth rate of real GDP is considered, as well as variation in the trend component for the rate of inflation (as approximation of core inflation). The trend components are calculated using an HP filter.
Primary balance and regime-switching of the debt ratio dynamics
The estimation results are shown in tables 1 to 4 and correspond respectively to cases where the transition variable is the structural fiscal balance (trend component of the primary balance) and the cyclical component of the primary balance. The TVPMS model shows the existence of two regimes, one in which the debt ratio increases (regime 2) and the second where it diminishes (regime 1). Indeed, in each regime, the average rate at which the debt ratio increases or decreases is indicated by the conditional mean of the endogenous variable calculated from estimates of the constant and autoregressive terms (on average the debt ratio diminishes by 3% and increases from 6% to 12%) 12 .
In table 1, the coefficient b 2 is positive and significant at 10% suggesting that, if one starts out from an initial situation where the debt ratio is increasing (regime 2), despite an improvement in the structural primary balance, it is likely that two years later it will continue to increase 13 . If one starts from an initial situation where the debt ratio decreases (regime 1), it is impossible to say whether it will continue to diminish or not (b 1 is non-significant). Over the period, budgetary consolidations took on average two years before producing their effect on the debt ratio. Where one started out from an initial situation in which the debt ratio was increasing, budgetary efforts were unable to reverse this trend. Starting out from an initial situation where the debt ratio was decreasing, the consequences were extremely variable over time: budgetary consolidations were followed by a rise or fall in the debt ratio, such that it would have been difficult to predict its evolution ex ante. The reductions in structural primary deficits thus had a weak impact in stopping rises in the public debt ratio. But this involved an "average" effect over the period studied. Figure 2c shows that this was the case, especially as from the middle of the 1950s (the probability of change from regime 2 to regime 1 is close to zero). Periods of reduction in the debt ratio consecutive to an improvement in primary structural balances seem nevertheless to have existed. As shown in figure 2c, this concerns, in particular, the years from 1909 to 1924 and to 1949, which covers part of the historical period named "Belle Epoque", the great depression of the 1930s and the two world wars, as well as the first four years of reconstruction. Figure 2d shows that the likelihood of switching to a regime of falling debt ratio could be explained by the higher budget surpluses when the country started out from a situation characterized by a strong initial degradation of the primary balance. Figure 2b shows that the passage from phases of increasing debt ratio to falling debt ratio was in particular observed for levels of structural primary deficits of less than 4%, with marked variability in the debt ratio at the time of regime-switching (the transition function having a steep slope). INSERT FIGURES 3a, 3b, 3c ABOUT HERE As illustrated by tables 3 and 4, if the increase in cyclical fiscal balances could, before the 1950s, provide a means to bring about a reduction in the debt ratio, this mechanism worked in a highly transitory manner. Indeed, by increasing lags in the transition variable (t-1 in table 3 and t-2 in table 4), it can be seen that it is impossible to predict in which direction the debt ratio is supposed to vary one year after an improvement in the budget balance (b 1 and b 2 are not significant in table 3). Worse, over the two years following an improvement in the conjunctural budget balance, there were chances that the debt ratio continued to increase where such was already the case initially (b 2 being positive and significant to 10% in table 4).
If it was diminishing, nothing could be said of its future trend (b 1 not being significant in table 2).
INSERT TABLES 3 et 4 ABOUT HERE
Improving primary balances and reducing deficits thus does not seem to have been a strategy capable of durably evolving from periods of rising to decreasing debt ratio since the middle of the 1950s. However, between 1890 and 1950, this was the case, though at specific periods corresponding to the years prior to the first World War (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) or the years following the two world wars (1920-1927 and 1946-1948) . During those years, even if improvement in budget balance made the scenario of a change in the debt ratio trend from an upward to a downward cycle likely, this involved a highly transitory effect, the improvement in primary balances being followed a few years later with new increases in the debt. An interesting point is that an improvement in budget balances increased the probability that the debt ratio diminish provided it was extremely substantial, in fact after these balances had been strongly degraded a few years previously (see Figures 2d and 3d ).
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Effect of growth and debt burden
Has economic growth (measured by the rate of relative variation in real GDP) had an impact on the dynamics of the public debt ratio since 1890? To answer this question, the effects of medium-term growth (measured by the trend component of the real GDP growth rate is used as potential growth) have to be differentiated from those of the cycle on public debt.
The estimates of table 5 suggest that there was a mechanical effect of the business cycle on the debt ratio. Assuming the latter increased initially, the likelihood for it to diminish following a rise in the real GDP increased (the coefficient b 2 being significantly negative).
The probability that it will continue to diminish, if such were already the case before the rise in GDP, was also higher (b 1 being significantly positive). But this concerned average behavior. Indeed, Figure 4a shows that this virtuous effect of growth manifestly only worked up to the early 1950s. It also reveals that this is a mechanical, instantaneous and not a sustained effect, account being taken of the "choppy" nature of the transition from one trend to another. Figure 4b confirms that, when a regime-switch occurred, it took place in brutal fashion (reflected in the near vertical slope of the transition function). After the 1950s, it thus seems that the business cycle has had a weak predictive capability in explaining the development of the State's debt ratio.
INSERT TABLES 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE INSERT FIGURES 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d ABOUT HERE
The trending growth rate's impact is different. On average, comparing its evolution with that of the growth rate of the debt burden, there seems not to be systematic evidence of an inversion in the dynamics of the debt in the event of a rise of trend growth. The estimates show that it did not produce effects to maintain the debt ratio on a downward path over periods where the ratio had started to drop (the coefficient b 1 in Table 6 is not significantly different from zero). In addition, it seems that the debt ratio continued to increase after periods of higher trending growth (the coefficient b 2 being positive and significant). Figure 4c shows that the trending growth rate had a high predictive capacity in foreseeing phases where the debt ratio diminished between 1890 and the years prior to the depression of the 1930s, as well as from the middle of the 1940s up to the beginning of the 1980s. The posterior probability of the debt ratio evolving in a downward spiral was weak, either when the debt burden (measured as a percentage of GDP) increased more quickly than the real GDP, as was the case during the decade of the 1930s (see Figure 4d) , or when the differential between growth in real GDP and that of the debt burden was not significant. In this respect, Figure 4d shows that during the years of the Belle Epoque (years 1890 to 1914), it was sufficient for there to be a 1% gap on average between the trend growth rate of the real GDP and that of the debt burden to lead to a downward cycle in the debt ratio. Since the middle of the 1980s, the gap has had to be at least 2.5%. In other words, the effort required in terms of long-term growth to bring about a reduction in the debt ratio, considering the debt burden, appears to be greater at the end of the century than at the beginning. Table 7 sets out the results of estimation when the rate of variation of the inflation rate is retained as an advanced indicator of the debt ratio. As in previous estimations, the TVPMS model distinguishes two regimes of rise and fall of the debt ratio. The coefficient b 2 is negative and significant. Consequently, episodes of rising inflation allowed the debt ratio to be reduced when the latter rose initially. 
Effect of inflation
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURES 5a and 5b ABOUT HERE As the greater variability in the debt ratio over the first half of the sample is likely to influence the estimates obtained over the entire period, our equations have been re-estimated restricting the sample to the years following 1949.
When the period of estimation is reduced to the years 1950 to 2009, the growth rate of the real GDP and inflation rate appear to be good predictors of the evolution in the debt ratio. is the difference between the trending growth rate of real GDP and the growth rate of interest charges expressed as a percentage of GDP. In Table 9 , the advanced indicator retained is the variation in the trend component of the inflation rate. The two tables differ by the fact that, in the first, regime 1 is that of upward cycle phases in the debt ratio, whereas in the second these are described by regime 2.
It appears that any increase in the difference between the growth rate in real GDP and that of the debt burden made it possible two years later to predict a reduction in the debt ratio whatever the initial situation of either a rise or a fall in the debt ratio (b 1 is significant and negative and b 2 is significant and positive). However, Figure 6a shows that this was the case up to the beginning of the 1980s, then during years 2001 and 2002. As for the role of inflation, the results of the regression in Table 9 show significant influence, in so far as inflationary pressures will have increased the probability of switching from an upward cycle to a downward cycle in the debt ratio. Figure 6b Over the period 1890 to 2009, the previous estimates thus reveal "breaks" in the influence of its various determinants on the debt ratio. 
The terms appearing in the right-hand side of the equation measure the contributions of the debt burden, the inflation rate, the real GDP growth rate, inflation and economic growth and of the primary balance to the variation in the debt ratio. Figures 7 to 10 represent the various contributions in the case where 1, i.e. when variations in the debt ratio from one year to another are examined. Figure 1 shows that, since the beginning of the 1980s, the debt ratio has seen no further diminution, with at the most the upward trend being slowed down during some years. There exists a "break" as compared with previous years where the debt ratio alternated between upward and downward periods. From 1980 onwards, the primary balance has generally been contributing to augmenting the debt ratio, which illustrates another difference as compared with previous years when its contribution was on average negative in times of peace and outside the years of major crisis (see Figure 7) . To explain what would appear to correspond to a discontinuity in the way the primary balance contributes to the debt's dynamics, a number governments who sought to bring it down at all costs (whence the priority given to the objective of budget balance).
The contributions confirms two major breaks/discontinuities (1950 and 1980)
Our econometric findings also support the historical observations over different sub-periods
1890-1900. A high level of debt despite low primary deficits. The debt ratio diminishes thanks to growth.
A first interesting element of comparison lies in the fact that the contribution of the debt burden for that period is at a level comparable with that of the years following 1990 ( Figure   8 ). The debt burden is high because the debt itself is high. Indeed, during the entire second half of the 19 th century, interest rates were low (the Banque de France discount rate varied around 2%), but the governments ran into debt to finance their spending in public infrastructure. The Freyssinet Plan had been launched in 1879 in a context of economic crisis, seeing French growth declining as compared with that of Germany and the United States and the economic consequences of the 1870 war being felt with in particular the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, two economically thriving regions. Over the decade 1890 to 1900, France continued its policy of building major public infrastructure. However, instead of activating its public expenditure to finance the construction of infrastructures, the governments preferred to guarantee loans for companies (private at this time) to implement reconstruction in certain key sectors like the railways, roads, ports and inland waterways. This financing of infrastructures through loan guarantees was not registered in the general budget, but appears as off-budget expenditure. The government spent all the less in so far as the tax system was under construction (many taxes were not very progressive and scarcely redistributive, with the main share being related to land ownership). All this explains why the contribution of the primary balance to variations in the debt ratio is negative (Figure 7) , even if the loan guarantees provided by the governments led it in reality to accumulating burdensome financial expenses and a high level of debt. The expenditure by the companies benefiting from
State guarantees generated growth (of 2.4% on average over the period) above the discount rate of the economy, which caused a drop in the debt ratio.
1901-1913. A strong inflationary surge associated with vigorous growth contributes to
reducing the debt ratio.
Compared to the previous decade, economic growth was even higher (with a difference in relation to the higher interest rate). Inflation kicked in again under the effect of the acceleration in industrial growth and the strong takeoff in financial liquidity (the rate of inflation thus went from 1.6% between 1860 and 1890 to 2.4% between 1890 and 1913). As a result, inflation contributed strongly to the debt ratio being diminished, especially over the three last years ( Figure 9 ). The contribution of the primary balance remained negative as the policy of implementing major public infrastructure lost steam.
1919-1925. The initial conditions related to a high debt burden weigh down heavily on the debt ratio.
The first striking fact here is the very strong negative contribution of the inflation rate Strong inflation combined with outstanding growth explains why the debt ratio was at its historical all-time low and that it was decreasing at a rate greater than that observed for example between 1890 and 1913 ( Figure 1 ). In addition, a period of exceptionally low interest rates explains that the debt burden contributed slightly to an increase in the debt ratio (Figure 8 ). In this context, the governments achieved budget surpluses and the contribution of the primary balance was negative (Figure 7 ).
1971-1979. Inflation and growth mask the budgetary imbalances to come.
This period corresponds to that of the so-called "stop and go" policies (economic surges followed by "cooling-off periods") which illustrate the dilemma between inflation and unemployment following on from the two oil crises. In 1974, faced with the rise in inflation, the French government initiated a restrictive economic policy (tightening of credit accompanied by new price controls), but as from the third quarter of 1975, this was loosened and the budget deficit increased. Once again, the recovery was interrupted in 1976, as it was considered too strong. Over this period, the primary balance thus contributed, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively, to variation in the debt ratio (Figure 7) . The growth rate continued to curb the rise in the debt ratio, but less so than over the previous decade ( Figure   10 ). Stop and go policies had the effect of ensuring the debt ratio failed to diminish any further (Figure 1 ).
to 2009. A major break in the contributions of debt determinants to the dynamics of debt ratio
During this period, growth and inflation rates were no longer adequate to counter the effect of the primary balance on the rise in the debt ratio. came from the primary balances that were in surplus and thus contributed to bringing about a reduction in the debt ratio. This has no longer been the case since 1980. The rise in primary deficits fed the increase in the debt and its burden (Figures 1 and 8) . Consequently, in the context of primary deficits following a general upward trend, growth and/or inflation rates much higher than those actually observed would have been needed to bring down the debt ratio.
From 1980, the debt ratio has thus failed to pursue any further downward trend, but has fluctuated through alternating periods characterized by years of upward movement followed by stabilization. These fluctuations in the debt ratio illustrate a form of intertemporal inconsistency in budget policy, with the upward and stabilization phases of the debt ratio reflecting the political-electoral cycle. 
Conclusion: what does history tells us about the future dynamics of the French debt?
One major conclusion that emerges from the above analyses is the following. Stabilizing the debt ratio (by slowing its upward progression or ensuring that it does not increase from one year to the next) will not be enough to reverse its overall upward movement. On the contrary, the debt ratio is more likely to evolve in different "steps", but continuing the upward trend. This is what has been observed since 1980, whereas previously, through setting a budget balance objective, governments made it a rule to bring about a drop in the debt ratio where it had increased over the previous years. If the present article had been completed before 1980, we would readily have concluded that as the economy recovers, a rise in prices or budget surpluses would have provided sufficient conditions to lead to a reduction in debt.
However, this no longer applies since the beginning of the 1980s and a number of interpretations of the above results can be proposed.
It could be considered that the problem stems primarily from primary balances (because they are not sufficiently on the surplus side, and growth and inflation cannot contribute to achieving a reduction in the debt ratio). It was seen in the econometric section that the primary balance has made a poor predictor of the debt ratio since 1980. It is thus possible to have primary surpluses without the debt ratio necessarily diminishing, especially when starting out from an initial situation where it had already strongly increased (which has been the case since the implementation of stop and go policies). At most one will see success in slowing down its upward movement (as during the years of the Jospin government). If one sought to curb the upward dynamics of the debt, the solution could thus involve ensuring that once the rise became stabilized, the ratio does not again start to increase. The idea of tying government hands by measures such as stiffening the European Pact or making budgetary rules constitutionally binding can be seen to be based on such considerations. However, given the weight pulled by the State in the French economy, this approach is likely to raise debate.
In particular, such a strategy could involve the government returning to budget balance before considering any budgetary recovery plan, an approach that has already led in the past to criticism, with some recommending vigorous action to cut back on deficits until the return of budget balances while others reckon this strategy to have been a vain sacrifice considering the economic cost of the public debt that has accumulated over the last 30 years.
Another interpretation suggests that episodes of reduction in the debt ratio have very often followed periods of extremely high inflation (beginning of the twentieth century before the First World War and during the economic boom of the thirty years following World War Two). In answer to this, it could be argued that inflation today has effects on the debt burden.
On the one hand, the nominal interest rate required by bond holders would compensate for the drop in real yield. In addition, one difference as compared with the beginning of the twentieth century is that the debt is no longer held on a perpetual basis by rentiers, but that the structure of maturities on French public debt is predominantly in the short term, which requires the government to frequently resort to debt on the capital markets to repay previous maturities.
Borrowing during periods of high inflation would weigh heavily on the debt burden, and thus on the debt itself. Not to mention the fact that holding such debt would appear to be more risk-fraught, meaning the debt burden would be further compounded by increased allowances 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 50 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1905-1915 ; 1920-1927 ;1940-1945 ; 1946-1949 diminishes provided that the primary surplus remains positive none
